Peace and Justice: Notes on the Evolution and Purposes of Legal Processes by Menkel-Meadow, Carrie
Georgetown University Law Center
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW
2005
Peace and Justice: Notes on the Evolution and
Purposes of Legal Processes
Carrie Menkel-Meadow
Georgetown University Law Center, meadow@law.georgetown.edu
Inaugural Lecture of the A.B. Chettle, Jr. Chair in Dispute Resolution and Civil Procedure,
Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, D.C., Apr. 25, 2005
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from:
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/fac_lectures/10
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author.
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/fac_lectures
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, and the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons
GEORGETOWN LAW 
Faculty Lectures 
 
 
Georgetown Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 901262 
October 2010 
 
 
Peace and Justice: Notes on the Evolution and 
Purposes of Legal Processes 
 
 
Inaugural Lecture of the A.B. Chettle, Jr. Chair in Dispute Resolution 
and Civil Procedure 
Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, D.C., Apr. 25, 2005 
 
 
 
94 Geo. L.J. 553-580 (2006) 
 
 
Carrie Menkel-Meadow  
A.B. Chettle, Jr. Professor of Dispute Resolution and Civil Procedure 
Georgetown University Law Center 
meadow@law.georgetown.edu 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded without charge from: 
Scholarly Commons:  http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/fac_lectures/10/ 
SSRN:  http://ssrn.com/abstract=901262 
Posted with permission of the author 
LECTURE
Peace and Justice: Notes on the Evolution and
Purposes of Legal Processes
Inaugural Lecture of the A.B. Chettle, Jr. Chair in Dispute
Resolution and Civil Procedure
CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW*
Throughout human history, tragically, we have seen more advances in tools for waging
war than in the art of making peace.
President William Jefferson Clinton1
Law is but the means, justice is the end.
Attributed to a Georgetown University Law Center Student2
Life is itself a process, and by making process the center of our attention we are getting
closer to the most enduring part of reality. For that reason I believe that the recommended
emphasis on procedures for solving conflicts will not tend simply to suppress those
conflicts, but will promote their just solution. If we do things the right way, we are likely to
do the right thing.
Lon Fuller3
Process is the human bridge between justice and peace.
Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow4
* A.B. Chettle, Jr. Professor of Dispute Resolution and Civil Procedure; Director, Georgetown-
Hewlett Program in Conflict Resolution and Legal Problem Solving. © 2006, Carrie Menkel-Meadow.
Thanks to the entire Georgetown University Law Center community for making this event one of the
intellectual and emotional highlights of my life. Thanks especially to Dean Alex Aleinikoff, Associate
Dean Vicki Jackson, and former Dean Judith Areen for their ongoing support. Thanks to Robin West,
Peter Reilly, Marc Spindelman, David Mattingly, and especially Robert Meadow for what I consider to
be the best of engaged intellectual and emotional friendships on these and other issues. Thanks to
Robert Valentine, Esq. and Richard Burkley as representatives of the Chettle family, for their generosity
to the Law Center. Thanks to Kara Tershel, Katherine McCarthy, Shari Thomas, and their staffs for
making this event beautiful, with the smoothest of processes. And finally, thanks, most importantly, to
my students, who continue to engage with the issues presented here in increasingly diverse locations of
our increasingly multicultural international reality.
1. William J. Clinton, Acceptance Speech for the Second Annual International Advocates for Peace
Award, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law (Mar. 19, 2001).
2. Attributed to a Georgetown University Law Center Student, Inscription on the Edward Bennett
Williams Law Library, perhaps paraphrased from Rudolph von Jhering, DER ZWECK IM RECHT (1913),
“law is merely a means to an end.”
3. Lon L. Fuller, What the Law Schools Can Contribute to the Making of Lawyers, 1 J. LEGAL EDUC.
189, 204 (1948).
4. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Inaugural Lecture of the A.B. Chettle, Jr. Chair in Dispute Resolution
and Civil Procedure (Apr. 25, 2005).
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I. FOUNDATIONS AND INFLUENCES: THE IMPORTANCE OF PROCESS PLURALISM FOR
BUILDING A “HOUSE OF PEACE AND JUSTICE”
This Chair honors the importance of legal process, whether it be formal, as in
civil procedure and rules, or more informal, as in human forms of conflict and
dispute resolution. I have devoted my professional life to both of these, first as a
litigating lawyer, seeking justice in civil rights and poverty law, and later as a
teacher and practitioner of negotiation, mediation, and more complex forms of
dispute resolution, including, most recently, consensus building, restorative
justice (such as truth and reconciliation processes), and deliberative democracy,
which seek not only justice, but peace, in both domestic and international
contexts.
As a process person, I am often asked what my “substantive commitments”5
are. So, I hope here to elaborate on why I think process is so important for those
of us who seek justice and peace in the world, and what I hope the Chettle Chair
will contribute to the study and practice of legal processes, beyond the rules of
civil procedure. The modern world has given us many new forms of injustice,
violence, continuing discrimination and subordination, and a new set of deadly
challenges in our responses to so-called “clashes of civilizations”6 and terror-
ism. We have many conventional institutions of law and justice and governmen-
tal decisionmaking, but, in my view, they have been inadequate to make the
kind of justice and peace I want for this world. So my study of “process
pluralism” comes from a belief that new processes of human engagement,
including reason, principle, fair bargaining, passions, and moral and emotional
empathy, will be necessary for us to solve new (and old) human problems so we
can live together in peace, with justice.
Here I will explore how we might build a “house7 of justice” with the
possibilities of achieving justice and human understanding in a variety of
different ways. I hope to do this by giving you both some autobiographical and
intellectual histories, which, given that I am a scholar, teacher, and practitioner,
all at the same time, I hope will get you all to think about what we think, how
5. Most recently I have been asked this question by Georgetown University Law Center Visiting
Professor of Law Marc Spindelman, whom I thank for several vigorous conversations about the topics
herein and our “performance” of the best of academic processes—the intellectual coffee klatsch.
Professors Hart and Sacks (and to some extent, for different reasons, Lon Fuller), as proponents of the
“Legal Process” school of the 1950s (see below) were often taken to similar task for abandoning some
of the substantive commitments of the Legal Realists. See MORTON J. HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION
OF AMERICAN LAW 1870–1960: THE CRISES OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 254–55 (1992). My own substantive
commitments are to fairness, equality, reduction of human pain and suffering, care for all human
beings, tolerance (indeed, enjoyment of differences and diversity), peaceful coexistence wherever
possible, and justice, while recognizing that all of these are aspirations with ill-defined boundaries and
too much abstract content.
6. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, in THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AFTER THE
COLLAPSE OF THE EAST-WEST ORDER 7, at 7 (Armande Cleese et al. eds., 1994).
7. Not a court! Apologies to Frank Sander, one of my predecessors in this, for his earlier attempts to
create a “multi-door courthouse.” See Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 77 F.R.D.
111 (1976).
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we learn, what we do, and what we can pass on to others who come after us,
whether you are a teacher, lawyer, student, parent, or citizen.
I hope to persuade you that process matters (a lot), by exploring the meaning
of different processes to legal and political philosophers, practitioners of pro-
cess, and “receivers” of process (we, the constituents of any legal order). I will
do this by reviewing my own formative influences—in theory (Lon Fuller and
other classic “process school” theorists) and practice—which constitute the
foundations of my house. I will build a “main floor” from some recent academic
work on the structures and functions of different kinds of process for different
problems (from the comparative constitutionalism of scholar Jon Elster), and
from new forms of actualized process (like truth and reconciliation commis-
sions in post-conflict and newly democratic societies, as well as the September
11 Victims Compensation Fund). And then, I will ask you to imagine with me
the upper (and more aspirational) floors of innovations in legal process to build
this “house” of justice, considering such recent experiments as deliberative
democracy and consensus-building as new forms of citizen engagement and
decisionmaking in both domestic and international contexts. I will then worry a
bit about the winds or rains that could damage or tear the house down (impedi-
ments or challenges to achieving a responsive house of justice).8 As our needs
for new kinds of justice and peace (and respect for living together with great
differences) have changed and expanded, so must the kinds of process we have
expand to meet the ever-increasing complexities of our culturally plural world.
Learning about law and legal process has been for me a deeply experiential
and interdisciplinary journey, and so I want you all to think about law as a
subject to be learned through many different lenses. I will elaborate here on
some of the underlying values of what it means to care about modern process
and procedure, what I call “process pluralism.” Process pluralism means paying
attention to a variety of different systemic values (some of which may seem
oppositional to each other) and party needs at the same time, and offering
variegated possibilities of process for engagement and decisionmaking. Such
values include the attempt to achieve peace with justice, choice and self-
determination of the individual with care and responsibility for others, and
recognition of the harms of the past with hopes for reconciliation in the future. I
will illustrate efforts to do these things by describing some new processes that
are making their way into the legal and political system (not just negotiation and
mediation, but deliberative democracy and consensus building) and by reflect-
ing a bit on some of the problems still to be considered in the use of these
processes. Some of the nettlesome issues to explore here include: (1) the
relation of principle and social justice to compromise and consensus; (2) the
need to include at least three forms of human discourse in human problem
8. This turn of phrase seems particularly apt after the destruction caused by Hurricane Katrina in the
Gulf Coast region of our country, with which came claims of inequality in rescue activities and lack of
coordination by federal, state, and local governmental authorities.
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solving and legal decisionmaking: principled argument, traded or bargained
preferences,9 and passionate commitments of emotion, religion, and moral
values; (3) the tensions presented by needing rules of process and (perhaps
different) rules of decision; and finally, (4) what I call the Oscar Wilde prob-
lem—if socialism takes up too many evenings,10 imagine what process plural-
ism and participatory democracy will do to our social lives. Do we have the
time, desire, and commitment to fully participate in the processes of our polities
and personal lives?
In my work and life I have had many mentors, both personally known and
unknown, who have taught me intellectually and conceptually through their
ideas, and behaviorally and inspirationally through their actions. Coming of age
when I did (through the complacent 1950s and the turbulent 1960s), the key
question for me (as it was for Emma Goldman) is how to remake the world to
be fair and just while using processes that honor the world we want to create
through those processes.11 Coming of age as a scholar and teacher in a later era
of postmodern skepticism about universal human “truths” and exciting, if
rupturing, intellectual diversity in legal studies, the social sciences and the
humanities; demographic diversity in our society; and increased international
interaction in the world, I became a fervently committed “pluralist.”12
9. See generally MARTIN BENJAMIN, SPLITTING THE DIFFERENCE: COMPROMISE AND INTEGRITY IN ETHICS
AND POLITICS (1990); NOMOS XXI: COMPROMISE IN ETHICS, LAW, AND POLITICS (J. Roland Pennock & John
W. Chapman eds., 1979).
10. OSCAR WILDE, A LIFE IN QUOTES 238 (Barry Day ed., 2000) (“The trouble with Socialism
[sometimes rendered as “democracy”] is that it takes up too many evenings [sometimes rendered as
“meetings”].”). In his witty way, Oscar Wilde, concerned about the pleasures of life, reminds us that
politics, if fully participatory, as democrats would have it be, may leave us with nothing else to do or
enjoy!
11. “If I can’t dance, I don’t want to be in your revolution.” The quotation is attributed to Emma
Goldman, but its pedigree is actually more complicated. See Alix Kates Shulman, Dances with
Feminists, WOMEN’S REV. OF BOOKS, Dec. 19, 1991, available at http://sunsite.berkeley.edu/Goldman/
Features/dances_shulman.html. Its more complex origin can be found in Emma Goldman’s autobiogra-
phy. See EMMA GOLDMAN, LIVING MY LIFE (1931); see also Alix Kates Shulman, Emma Goldman’s
Feminism: A Reappraisal, in EMMA GOLDMAN, RED EMMA SPEAKS: AN EMMA GOLDMAN READER 3 (Alix
Kates Shulman ed., 1996). What I take from this infamous quote, emblazoned on the tee shirts of my
feminist 1960s, was that the process used to create a new society (anarchism, which I have never
supported) should be a process that should survive the revolution—we should employ the same means
to govern and run our society as those which created it. “[A] revolution without dancing, without
‘beautiful radiant things’ [is] not worth fighting for.” Shulman, Emma Goldman’s Feminism: A
Reappraisal, supra, at 15 (quoting GOLDMAN, LIVING MY LIFE, supra, at 56).
In a modern scholarly inquiry into this problem, Archon Fong has attempted to elaborate an “ethics
of politics” that calibrates the use of deliberative or non-deliberative political processes to the degree
that post-revolutionary conditions of equality and fairness have been achieved in particular political
settings. See Archon Fong, Deliberation Before the Revolution: Toward an Ethics of Deliberative
Democracy in an Unjust World, 33 POL. THEORY 397, 397–401 (2005) (discussing the contradictions in
trying to use deliberative strategies in environments where deliberation is structurally problematic, e.g.,
economic, cultural, and political inequalities).
12. My religious training in the Ethical Culture Society no doubt played a large role in this. Each
year as children in Sunday school, we studied another religion—from Buddhism to Taoism, Protestant-
ism to Catholicism, Judaism to Islam—leaving me with a skepticism about the details of agreed-upon
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A. THEORY
The British social philosopher Stuart Hampshire, in what turned out to be his
last major work, Justice Is Conflict,13 opined that because we are unlikely ever
to reach any real, uniform consensus on what constitutes the “substantive good”
in a deeply pluralist and divided world, perhaps we can, at best, arrive at some
close-to-universal principles for processes that enable us to live together within
these differences. For him, this process is audi alterum partum (“hear the other
side,” or the Anglo-American adversary principle). For me, as I will elaborate
below, it is closer to “understand all sides” of our modern multi-partied and
multi-issued disputes.14 So I substitute “understand” for Hampshire’s “hear” (a
deeper level of human engagement and empathy, as well as reason) and “all”
sides for Hampshire’s “other” or “two” sides. Modern social and legal life needs
to get beyond the binary, adversarial idea that there are only two sides to an
argument or the “truth.”15
“Understanding” and “coexistence” as aspirational values of peace16 give us
some goals and end-states but do not tell us much about how to get there.
Political theorists and philosophers over the years have elaborated many theo-
ries of political and social organization, from Hobbes’s Leviathan17 and Rawls’s
“veil of ignorance”18 to Habermas’s “ideal speech conditions for uncoerced
communicative action.”19 Most recently, a movement and plea for “deliberative
democracy” harkening back to Aristotelian notions of participatory democracy
values but an abiding hope for some universal notions of care and concern for others. From this
important socialization experience I also developed a deeply felt love of anthropological study—the
deep appreciation of human differences and the importance of man’s (and woman’s) work on respectful
coexistence on this earth. See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, And Now a Word About Secular
Humanism, Spirituality, and the Practice of Justice and Conflict Resolution, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1073 (2001). I also grew up in the shadow of the United Nations, which was born the same year I was.
See MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2001) (reporting on the founding of the U.N. and Eleanor Roosevelt’s “mediational”
role in the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights).
13. STUART HAMPSHIRE, JUSTICE IS CONFLICT 8–12, 16–17 (2000).
14. See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern,
Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5 (1996).
15. See generally DEBORAH TANNEN, THE ARGUMENT CULTURE: MOVING FROM DEBATE TO DIALOGUE
3–26 (1998) (exploring the adversarial “agonism” of politics, law, journalism and media, education and
American cultural practices, and communication patterns). Or as my dear research assistant and Editor
in Chief of this Journal put it, “traditional legal education conceptualizes all thought in binary—us vs.
them—form.” E-mail from David Mattingly to Carrie Menkel-Meadow (Apr. 20, 2005) (on file with
author).
16. See generally, e.g., COLMAN MCCARTHY, ALL OF ONE PEACE: ESSAYS ON NONVIOLENCE (1994);
COLMAN MCCARTHY, I’D RATHER TEACH PEACE (2002); LISA SCHIRCH, THE LITTLE BOOK OF STRATEGIC
PEACEBUILDING (2004); MICHAEL WALZER, ON TOLERATION (1997). For the difficulties of actually achiev-
ing understanding and coexistence in ethnically diverse communities, see generally MICHAEL IGNATIEFF,
BLOOD AND BELONGING: JOURNEYS INTO THE NEW NATIONALISM (1993) (exploring the ethnic conflicts in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kurdistan, Northern Ireland, and other sites of modern ethnic conflict).
17. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (E.P. Dutton & Co. 1950) (1660).
18. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136–42 (1971).
19. 2 JU¨RGEN HABERMAS, A THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 72–74 (Thomas McCarthy trans.,
1985).
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and argument have inspired much writing on how we can achieve legitimate
and fair consensus and good decisions at all levels of human interaction and
conflict, even when we have deep conflicts about facts and values.20 These
recent efforts seek to provide a legitimating and explanatory framework for how
to seek fair and “just” outcomes in highly conflictual situations of disputes,
conflicts, policy, and law-making.
It is my hope to marry this work on deliberative democracy to conflict
resolution theory and practice so that we might seek peace and justice (always
provisional and evolving in a postmodern world) simultaneously. In doing so, I
am extending and expanding on the work and influences of many in a variety of
important legal movements that have formed me: the Legal Process School,
Law & Society (socio-legal studies), feminism, the Civil Rights movement, the
Vietnam antiwar movement, clinical legal education, critical legal studies,
postmodernism, and Georgetown University Law Center’s very own interdisci-
plinary Curriculum B.21
B. TEACHING, PRACTICE, AND THE REAL WORLD
I begin with the person who inspired me to be the kind of teacher I am
today—committed to experiential, phenomenological, “in-role” (and clinical22)
learning: David Filvaroff, my professor of Judicial Process23 (using Hart and
20. See generally, e.g., JAMES BOHMAN, PUBLIC DELIBERATION: PLURALISM, COMPLEXITY, AND DEMOC-
RACY (1996); JOHN S. DRYZEK, DISCURSIVE DEMOCRACY: POLITICS, POLICY, AND POLITICAL SCIENCE (1990);
AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (1996); LAWRENCE SUSSKIND &
JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE (1987); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution
of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998) (all outlining and discussing various
conceptions of the use of deliberative, i.e., more participatory, democracy in positive decisionmaking at
all levels of government). See also NAT’L CIVIC REV., Winter 2004 (special issue on public deliberation).
21. In Curriculum B, I have taught our interdisciplinary version of Civil Procedure—Legal Process
and Society. Curriculum B, or Section 3, as it is called at Georgetown, is an elective full first-year
section devoted to enriched, interdisciplinary study of the traditional law school first-year courses.
Courses include Legal Justice (a jurisprudence seminar), Democracy and Coercion (combining criminal
and constitutional law), Bargain, Exchange, and Liability (contracts and torts), Legal Process and
Society (Civil Procedure), Property in Time, Government Processes (administrative, litigative, and
policy solutions to particular issues of legal and social regulation), and Legal Process (legal research
and writing). In all of these courses, the study of law is enriched with the study of the sources of law in
philosophy, political science, economics, sociology, anthropology, history, and other “mini-disciplines,”
such as game theory, cost-benefit analysis, critical legal studies, critical race theory, and legal feminism,
among others. This curriculum seeks to explore the more “public” aspects of law, as contrasted with the
more traditional curriculum’s emphasis on private law.
22. As Gary Bellow first defined it, clinical teaching is teaching about lawyering from inside a
“role,” but a role to serve social justice. See Gary Bellow, On Teaching the Teachers: Some Preliminary
Reflections on Clinical Education as Methodology, in COUNCIL ON LEGAL EDUC. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBIL-
ITY, CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT: LEGAL EDUCATION IN A SERVICE SETTING 374 (1973).
23. At the University of Pennsylvania Law School, circa 1971. Judicial Process was inaptly named,
because the purpose of this required first-year course was to “de-center” judicial processes and
introduce conventionally trained law students, immersed in appellate cases, to lawmaking activities
outside of courts, including legislation and law office practice. It was really an immersion in the Legal
Process School that several decades of law students were exposed to at Harvard and elsewhere. See
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to HENRY M. HART
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Sacks’s famous 1958 Temporary Edition of The Legal Process: Basic Problems
in the Making and Application of Law24). In a required first-year course,
intended to teach us about legal institutions, using both cases and non-case
report materials, Professor David Filvaroff asked his students to enact the roles
of legal process by proposing that we consider whether a new law (whether
slumlordism25 should be an actionable legal tort, crime, or regulatory infraction)
would best be adopted by a legislature, a regulatory agency, or a court. For
several weeks, students in that class assumed roles of clients, lawyers, legisla-
tors, advocates, judges, administrative officials, politicians, sociologists, ex-
perts, and critics as we sequentially enacted legislative, administrative, and
judicial processes of lawmaking. I served as a judge on a state supreme court
and wrote a dissenting opinion when I could not convince a majority of my
nine-member court to recognize a common law action for slumlordism (so
much for my advocacy skills!).26 I learned how to persuade, how to make
arguments, how to listen, and importantly, how to write. Whenever I now write
an arbitral opinion and think of the phrase, “the decision would not write,” I
think of how I learned to write with elaborated reasons in that class.
For those few weeks I was mesmerized by legal education in ways I had not
been in my first-year, standard, Professor Kingsfield27-One L28 experience. We
had to act, we thought, we argued, we researched, we wrote, and we even yelled
and screamed passionately (more on that later) at each other—because we cared
so much that the right thing be done and that it be done in the right way. (This
was the end of the 1960s, remember, which really did not end until 1974 with
the end of the Vietnam War and the resignation of President Richard Nixon,
after the Watergate scandal.) In those weeks I decided to “fight for justice”
through law, but I also saw that litigation-based court strategies were not the
only or best ways to get things done. The class, as a body of the whole, passed a
“tenancy conditions” statute as a legislature, with a majority vote, and also
managed to craft a pretty sophisticated administrative regulation when we could
not get five votes on our small court to do the same through common law
processes.
I also vowed that if I ever became a teacher I would never teach without an
experiential component to the learning—for each concept, each course, and
each theme of a course. So I became a legal services attorney to seek justice for
& ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW, at li
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
24. HART & SACKS, supra note 23.
25. See generally Joseph L. Sax & Fred J. Hiestand, Slumlordism as a Tort, 65 MICH. L. REV. 869
(1967).
26. Let the record reflect that a few years later I won my first case in the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit as a young legal services attorney. See McKnight v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 583 F.2d
1229 (3d Cir. 1978) (concerning the process due a discharged public employee under local, state,
federal, and constitutional law).
27. JOHN JAY OSBORN JR., THE PAPER CHASE (1971).
28. SCOTT TUROW, ONE L (1977).
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those too poor and disempowered in our society to be heard by those in power.
And, when I became a law teacher, I became a clinical teacher so that students
would come to understand the possibilities—or as my colleague Robin West
would say, the “nobility” of the law’s power29—from successful advocacy.
(And, I taught trial advocacy, civil procedure, and pre-trial process to show
students just how to use the law’s majestical, if overly complicated, rules,
procedures, and practices to achieve justice).
However, two other very important influences on my life turned me intellectu-
ally, spiritually, and existentially away from remaining what I have called
others—“litigation romanticists.” The first is my family (seated here with us
today)—refugees from the Nazi Holocaust—a regime legitimated, regulated,
and empowered by law to kill and commit injustice. Those of you in the
audience who are descendants of slaves yourselves, or relatives of black citizens
of South Africa, or “undocumented” immigrants will know the power of law to
commit injustice in its name, or as Robert Cover put it so famously, “vio-
lence.”30 So, as legal philosophers and jurisprudes theorized about “the morality
of law”31 in the wake of what law actually did (and still does), I, the child of
escapees from a system of unjust laws, approached American law school and
law practice with some hearty “justice skepticism.” Or, as I have argued in
several places, “justice is not necessarily the same as legal justice.”32
Second, while litigating as a legal services lawyer against large institutions
(state welfare departments, prisons, large employers, governmental agencies,
and school systems) I saw that we would often win the legal battle in those
glorious days of liberal law reform. Summary judgments on constitutional and
federal statutory claims, easy “law” cases, or intensive fact cases (involving, for
example, prison conditions or statistical employment discrimination) at trial or
before judges were “easy” to win in those heady days of liberal law reform and
a more progressive judiciary. But I learned quickly that winning judgments did
not so easily translate into changed policies or better lives for my clients. In the
back of my legal services office was one woman lawyer, who, instead of
bringing dramatic class action lawsuits, quietly cultivated relationships and
negotiated good outcomes for her clients. I learned that something I had not
been taught in law school—negotiation—could sometimes (not always) accom-
plish much good. This presented, of course, the age-old dilemma in legal justice
work of whether to do the greater good for the greater number (class actions?)
or solve individual problems of human need one at a time.
My practical experience of successful bargained-for outcomes in some social
29. Robin West, Law’s “Nobility,” YALE J.L. & FEMINISM (forthcoming 2006).
30. Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS OF
ROBERT COVER 203, 213–14 (Martha Minow et al. eds., 1992).
31. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
32. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and Democratic De-
fense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2672–76, 2687–91 (1995); see also David
Luban, Settlement and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2639 & n.86 (1995).
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justice cases resonated with my Legal Process learning in Professor Filvaroff’s
class, and I joined academe to teach and study legal processes with a decidedly
pragmatic and pluralist cast. The teaching and study of law should reflect the
multiple ways in which legal process serves as the means of “human problem-
solving,”33 including a variety of processes with their own “moral integrity.”
And in this, Lon Fuller, Harvard jurist and continuing practicing lawyer and
arbiter, was my teacher.
II. THE MORAL INTEGRITY OF PROCESS PLURALISM:
FOUNDATIONS OF A HOUSE OF JUSTICE
Lon Fuller, known for many ideas, was best known to me as the theorist of
“eumonics” or “the science, theory or study of good order and workable
arrangements.”34 Though he never fully elaborated this theory in one place,
Fuller spent a large portion of his career (inspired by his own law and arbitra-
tion practice) writing and theorizing about the differences among ten different
legal processes, each of which he claimed had its own “moral integrity” and
particular uses for assisting in the solution of widely different issues of human
problem-solving and governance. Those ten processes are:
1. Adjudication—the objective, neutral, and authoritative ruling by an officer
of the state to settle a dispute with “ordered principles, where the parties have
an opportunity to present proofs and reasoned arguments.”35
2. Arbitration—a decision or resolution of a dispute by principles of a
contract and by a decisionmaker chosen by the parties (generally in ongoing
relationships, such as labor-management and commercial relations).36
3. Mediation—a process directed to “bringing about a more harmonious
relationship between the parties, whether this be achieved through explicit
agreement, through a reciprocal acceptance of the social norms relevant to
their relationship or simply because the parties have been helped to a new and
33. I titled my first major scholarly article on the theory of an alternative, non-competitive approach
to legal negotiation “Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving,”
31 UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984), as a structural-functionalist plea for recognition of the purpose of law as
human problem-solving, described in earlier decades by Lon L. Fuller. See LON L. FULLER, THE
PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER: SELECTED ESSAYS OF LON L. FULLER 45 (Kenneth Winston ed., 2001)
(hereinafter The Principles of Social Order).
34. Lon L. Fuller, American Legal Philosophy at Mid-Century, 6 J. LEGAL EDUC. 457, 457, 477
(1954). Kenneth Winston supposes that this neologism was inspired by Jeremy Bentham, which seems
an appropriate ancestry for me, a bona fide utilitarianist and currently co-editor (with Professor Michael
Freeman) of the International Journal of Law in Context at Bentham’s university—the University of
London.
35. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 369 (1978).
36. Lon L. Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE
ARBITRATOR’S ROLE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTEENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
ARBITRATORS 8, 8–11 (Mark L. Kahn ed., 1962).
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more perceptive understanding of one another’s problems.”37 This is a pro-
cess intended to “reorient the parties toward each other,”38 particularly in the
ongoing relationships of marriage, commercial dealings, labor and employ-
ment, closely held corporations, tenants of public housing, and co-authors of a
book—where there is heavy (or thick) and complex interdependence of the
parties.
4. Legislation—the lawmaking function by which legitimately chosen represen-
tatives create the rules to govern the society. Fuller is most famous here for
elaborating the eight canons of lawmaking required by the “internal morality
of law” (and without which law would not be legitimate). These eight canons
are: (1) rules must be general; (2) rules must be promulgated publicly; (3)
rules must be prospective and not retrospective; (4) rules must be clear (and
understandable for the governed); (5) rules must not require contradictory
actions; (6) rules must not be impossible to conform to; (7) rules must remain
relatively constant over time; and (8) there should be congruence between the
rules as declared and the actions of rule enforcers or administrators.39
5. Contract—the creation of voluntary associations of mutual aid and enforce-
able promises of those wishing to act together, characterized by an ethic of
reciprocity and shared objectives with a “reliance” interest (and Fuller’s
related concerns with the “limits of individual autonomy”).40
6. Managerial direction (or administration)—the process by which rules made
(both publicly enacted laws and privately made contracts) are administered
and enforced and actions and resources are allocated.41
7. Voting and elections—the processes by which decisions are reached in a
variety of human gatherings and which can vary by choice of voting proce-
dure from simple majority, proportional voting, weighted voting, or superma-
37. Lon L. Fuller, Mediation—Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 308–09 (1971).
Appropriately, this essay was written as a festschrift honoring Fuller’s friend and colleague Henry M.
Hart and his Legal Process materials for asking the question, “What is the nature of the basic problem
and how shall we choose among the various procedures of social ordering that might be applied to it?”
Id. at 307.
38. Id. at 325.
39. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39, 46–91 (1964); see also Lon L. Fuller, The Implicit
Laws of Lawmaking, in THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 33, at 175. This is not the place to
rehearse the famous jurisprudential debate between Fuller and H.L.A. Hart about the nature, morality,
or concept of law, variously styled as a debate grounded in legal positivism, natural law, legal realism,
and legal process theory. Compare H.L.A. Hart, The Morality of Law, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1965)
(book review), and H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV.
593 (1958), with Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Response to Professor Hart, 71 HARV.
L. REV. 630 (1958).
40. See Lon L. Fuller, The Role of Contract in the Ordering Processes of Society Generally, in THE
PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 33, at 187–205.
41. Here Fuller’s most famous piece bears important relevance to us today in considering which
processes are most appropriate for complex allocation issues, as in the scarce resources of environmen-
tal law. See generally Lon L. Fuller, Irrigation and Tyranny, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1021 (1965).
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jorities,42 foreshadowing what we now call the study of “decision-rules” in
multiparty dispute resolution or decisionmaking.
8. Lottery—the process of “picking lots” when there is no fair or just
substantive principle for choosing a particular process or decision rule.
9. Customary law—“the reciprocal expectations that arise out of human
interaction,” or the “inarticulate older brother of contract,” or the informal
“patterns of interaction” that govern people who interact with each other more
than once and adopt implicitly ways and means of dealing with each other43
(the ultimate of “informal” processes, but still governed by some “internal
morality,”44 in Fuller’s language).
10. Property—that which a person has “command” over to use, control, or
give away.45
For Fuller, the lawyer’s role was to be a social structure or process “architect”
whose job was to consider questions of “appropriate” (as we say today, rather
than “alternative”) institutional design. Given the range of problems facing a
particular society (or the larger world), what are the best means for “effective”
problem solving? Fuller thought it important that lawyers and law students
study all of these processes in their locational specificity, and he was, to me, a
consummate sociologist and anthropologist who understood that there was
unlikely to be a single, unitary, or uniform legal process (or “concept of law”)
that would be appropriate for all circumstances. In this, Fuller, like me, was also
42. Fuller was among the first of legal scholars to acquaint himself with the rigors of game theory
and the uses of strategic means of voting and decisionmaking so relevant in today’s processes of
deliberative democracy and social choice theory. See generally Lon L. Fuller, An Afterword: Science
and the Judicial Process, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1604 (1966). He also recognized the importance of the
social-psychological study of group dynamics and attempted to draw law teachers’ attention to the work
of Kurt Lewin’s Field Theory in Social Science (1951)—work that is today so important to those who
study social and cognitive psychology in dispute resolution and behavioral economics. See, e.g.,
BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995); Chris Guthrie, Insights from
Cognitive Psychology, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 42 (2004); Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of
Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499
(1998); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113
(1996).
43. FULLER, supra note 33, at 194. These would be the practices constituting “the law of the shop” in
labor contexts and “standard practices,” “reasonable terms” in contracting, Uniform Commercial Code
settings, and customary international law.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 195–96. In many places Fuller began to collapse property into the contract category and he
often excluded customary law as a “process,” so his listings of “process pluralism” vary, in several
sources from five to seven to eight or nine different processes. The point is, Fuller recognized many
different legal processes, with adjudication being only one, and urged the study and teaching of the
different processes for both scholars and practicing lawyers. My own teaching of Civil Procedure in our
enriched Curriculum B is called “Processes and Society,” as an illustration of both process pluralism
and the social situatedness of different processes.
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a student of that American philosopher pragmatist—John Dewey.46 For Fuller’s
approach to legal process, like our more recent attempts to describe process
pluralism, evolved from seeing how particular institutions were created, devel-
oped, and performed their functions,47 or evolved over time.48 In the words of a
more modern student of professional practice, this is “theory-in-use.”49
At the same time, while Fuller’s own “morality of law” seems deeply
procedural (see the eight canons of properly enacted legislation above), he was
quite concerned with the “ethics” of the use of process—that is, with the ends to
which processes would be put. Fuller’s lawyer as an “architect of structure”50
has the same responsibility, in the drafting of contracts and the giving of advice
to clients as “the author of a constitution” in the creation of “just” forms of
structured interactions designed to avoid “waste,” save costs, develop “proce-
dures for readjusting prices to fluctuating business conditions” and effective and
fair dispute resolution in the event of a dispute, while “anticipating possible
sources of trouble” and “generally constructing a satisfactory framework for . . .
46. See Lon L. Fuller, The Needs of American Legal Philosophy, in THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER,
supra note 33, at 269. “The object of legal philosophy is to give an effective direction to the work of
judges, lawyers, legislators and law teachers,” and law students, I would add. Id. at 269–70. “If it leaves
the activities of these men [sic] untouched, if it has no implications for the question of what they do
with their working days, then legal philosophy is a failure.” Id. See generally ROBERT B. WESTBROOK,
JOHN DEWEY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1991).
47. Kenneth Winston, Fuller’s intellectual executor, has opined that Fuller is not to be considered a
member of the structuralist-functionalist school of 1950s–60s sociology, Kenneth Winston, Introduction
to THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 33, at 45, but I disagree. Fuller’s models of institutional
description and “design” seem to be closely related to Talcott Parsons’s famous sociological “pattern
variables” in which particular institutions and social roles are designed to “meet” social needs and
structure human interaction. TALCOTT PARSONS, ON INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL EVOLUTION 106–16 (1982).
Whether Fuller was at all actually influenced by Parsons (who was in Harvard’s sociology department
while Fuller taught at the Law School and with whom Fuller taught) remains to be more closely
examined, but like those of Parsons, Fuller’s institutional descriptions were a bit static. In general, he
was quite concerned with “mixed, parasitic or perverted” forms of social ordering when his processes
were combined, or hybridized, as in med-arb today. THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 33, at
118. As my modern students read of Fuller’s distaste for combining processes because of the potential
violations of their “internal” morality (consensual decisionmaking as in mediation and negotiation
versus authoritative decisionmaking in adjudication and arbitration), I ask them what he would make of
our modern hybrid processes such as the mini-trial, the summary jury trial, and the community
consensus-building forum (combining various forms of negotiation, mediation, voting, and lottery). See
generally CARRIE J. MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE ADVERSARIAL MODEL
(2005); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mothers and Fathers of Invention: The Intellectual Founders of ADR,
16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1 (2000).
48. Elsewhere, I have recently described a longer and broader view of the history of the evolution of
our legal processes and institutions from early customary law and procedures, to trial by ordeal and
oath, to trial by jury, to a “post-trial” and evolving legal system. See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Is the Adversary System Really Dead? Dilemmas of Legal Ethics as Legal Institutions and Roles
Evolve, 57 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 85 (Jane Holder et al. eds., 2004); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Roots
and Inspirations: A Brief History of the Foundations of Dispute Resolution, in HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE
RESOLUTION 13 (Michael L. Moffitt & Robert C. Bordone eds., 2005).
49. DONALD A. SCHO¨N, THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER: HOW PROFESSIONALS THINK IN ACTION (1983).
50. Fuller attributed this phrase to his Harvard colleague, Milton Katz, a fellow professor of law. See
Lon L. Fuller, The Lawyer as Architect of Social Structures, in THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER, supra
note 33, at 285–92 (a memo Fuller distributed to his jurisprudence class in 1952).
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future dealings.”51 But ends were, for Fuller, both more variable, not unidimen-
sional or unidirectional, and complex (“we eat to live, but we also live to eat”52)
and were to be more open-ended and examined within the choices of process
(consistent with the pleas of modern deliberative democracy theorists that
“outcomes” be left contingent and open if we are really to deliberate and learn
anything from each other). In short, good process should allow outcomes to be
“open and contingent” as they are arrived at in the best (most appropriate,
integrated, and ethical) way.
And, foreshadowing where I am going next, Fuller, the rationalist jurist,
recognized that ends or goals depend not only on rationality but on emotions,
intuitions, and feelings of what is right or fair. For him the goal of legal study
and philosophy was to do what this new Chettle Chair is devoted to—
developing a “coherent theory of forensic procedure.” For Fuller this meant
asking the question: “What kinds of human relations are best organized and
regulated by adjudication, and what others are better left to other procedures,
such as negotiation and voluntary settlement, majority vote, or expert manage-
rial authority?”53 I would rephrase this to ask, “What human problems are best
resolved, handled, or solved by what processes?” My question broadens the
kinds of processes that might be available and expands on the ways in which
problems in the legal and political arenas can be dealt with54 beyond “regula-
tion” and formal legal processes.
III. COMPARATIVE LEGAL AND POLITICAL PROCESSES:
THE MAIN FLOOR OF THE HOUSE OF JUSTICE
Now I want to turn to a more modern examination of process pluralism which
could have been inspired as one set of answers to Fuller’s questions. While the
Legal Process School of the 1950s55 tended to look for clarity in abstractions
and intellectual categories, more modern analysts have looked empirically at
how those processes actually work on the ground. Jon Elster, a political theorist
and student of comparative constitutional law, has examined the varieties of
processes we have used to create both constitutive governments and constitu-
tions and more “ordinary” and routine forms of citizen dispute resolution and
decisionmaking. In a short and compelling adaptation of his theoretical work for
51. Id. at 274.
52. Id. at 277. Fuller was definitely a man after my own heart!
53. Id. at 281.
54. In many contexts I have resisted the popular notion of conflict “resolution” because some
conflicts, in my view, should not be “resolved” or “managed.” Conflicts have been necessary for
justice—as with the passive resistence of Mahatma Ghandi, Martin Luther King, Jr., and the struggles
of the Civil Rights Movement; the antiwar protests I participated in in the 1970s, which turned the ship
of state around; the women’s movement and the millions of divorces and other social changes it
facilitated; and most revolutionary struggles for self-determination. See generally PETER ACKERMAN &
JACK DUVALL, A FORCE MORE POWERFUL: A CENTURY OF NONVIOLENT CONFLICT (2000).
55. See FULLER, supra note 33; HART & SACKS, supra note 23.
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conflict resolution professionals,56 Elster has mapped the different process
choices made in the formation of the American and French constitutions. This
analysis has been instrumental in my own attempt to expand Fuller’s ten
processes and our Framers’ three or four (executive, legislative, judicial, and
administrative) into a matrix of different processes, possible when we use
different motives, goals, and discourses in our interactions to seek decisions,
dispute resolution, or the creation of new transactions or entities. In short, when
we add Elster’s observations about the different (and strategic) uses of process,
our architecture may become more complicated, but the “house” of process will
be much more commodious.
Elster begins with three basic human motivations (or what I have called
“modes of discourse”):57 reasoned argument or principles, interests and prefer-
ences which may be bargained for or traded, and passions (including emotions
and religious or ethical beliefs). We think of law and legal process as the realm
of arguments, appeals to reason, and the rule of law and principles. Trading of
preferences and utilities is a process of interested but often “unprincipled”
bargaining: This is the realm of economics, Machiavelli, game theory, compro-
mise, and second-best politics.58 Over the centuries, philosophers have argued
about which of these basic human motivations trumps (think rock-paper-
scissors game) at various times and in various settings and whether group or
individual reasons, interests, or passions motivate us differently in different
settings (think altruism, blood feuds, getting into law school). Elster explores
how different versions of these motivations or “modalities” were enacted in the
political processes of constitution formation where reasons require claims of
validity (reasoned persuasion) and bargaining requires claims of credibility
(threats and promises). By reading transcripts of the deliberations and rhetoric
surrounding these constitutive processes, Elster concludes that the processes
used were quite different, with great impact on the resulting documents and
institutional formation.
The Americans were concerned with short-term self-interest,59 mostly eco-
nomic, despite our civics educations about high democratic principles. The
56. See Jon Elster, Strategic Uses of Argument, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 236 (Kenneth J.
Arrow et al. eds., 1995).
57. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, From Legal Disputes to Conflict Resolution and Human Problem
Solving, in DISPUTE PROCESSING AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THEORY, PRACTICE AND POLICY, at xi, xxx–
xxxii (2003); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer’s Role(s) in Deliberative Democracy: A Commen-
tary by and Responses to Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow, 5 NEV. L.J. 347, 365 (2004–2005).
58. Whether bargaining and negotiation are philosophically inferior to principle and reasoned
argument is a separate question about which I, and others, have written a great deal. See generally
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute Settlement and Rulemaking,
89 HARV. L. REV. 637 (1976); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 32. The theory of “compromise” is
currently an active area of philosophical, political, and sociological inquiry. See Compromise/
Compromis (Special Issue), 43 INFORMATION SUR LES SCIENCES SOCIALES 131–305 (2004).
59. See generally CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES (1998) (analyzing self-interested actions of propertied classes at the Constitutional
Convention and specific constitutional provision drafting).
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French were motivated by high principle (Liberte´, Egalite´, et Fraternite´!), as
well as high passion (from commitment to principles, revenge against the
monarchy, and amour-propre (vanity)). From these different motivations,60 the
French and American framers made a variety of different process choices. Elster
argues that these process choices affected which discourses were used and
which institutions were built, which in turn affected the modes of dispute
resolution or constitution formation, which in turn affected both the actual
outcomes of these processes and the robustness of their life expectancy.
The Americans chose secret meetings to avoid “public” posturing and what they
thought would lead to inflexibility61 and committee, rather than plenary, meetings.
The French chose—after great debate about the different effects of cool reason and
experience in committee settings versus more passionate commitment in plenary
sessions—open, public meetings (with the equivalent of the modern press conference
at the end of the day to report to the bloodthirsty revolutionaries) and appealed to both
high principles and great passions. (Recall how each change of principled regime
during the years of the French Revolution led to violent removal of those who did not
share those high principles and same passions!62)
Elster suggests that when the ideal (reasoned argument seems better than self-
interested interest bargaining, and open and transparent meetings seem more demo-
cratic than secret meetings) is contrasted with the real (what actually happened at the
two conventions), “second best” processes actually produced more robust (longer
lasting) governance. The Americans engaged in some pretty unprincipled bargaining
(permitting the slavery compromise with the commercial states) and some secret deals
(power balancing between more agricultural and more commercial states) but wound
up (yes, with a civil war that killed one million people and with many amendments)
with a more robust document (and government).
By creating a social scientist’s four-fold table of arguing and bargaining as
modes of discourse and open and secret as modalities of meetings, Elster
explores how the second and third best (in theory) forms of secret bargaining
and open arguing produced better outcomes than first best secret arguing (where
there would be avoidance of public pre-commitments and more principled
claims).63
Arguing Bargaining
Secret 1 (best) 2 (3)
Open 3 (2) 4 (worst)
60. Note that neither Elser nor I make any claims here about immutable “cultural” differences of the
French or American framers. Both of us adhere, I believe, to notions of historical, social, and political
contingencies, rather than cultural determinism.
61. Think public positional bargaining of Ronald Reagan’s behavior during the air traffic controller’s
strike in 1991.
62. See, e.g., CRANE BRINTON, THE ANATOMY OF REVOLUTION (1965).
63. Elster, supra note 56, at 251–52.
2006] 567PEACE AND JUSTICE: NOTES ON LEGAL PROCESSES
A bargaining mode at the American Convention permitted small states (with
less power) to use the discourse of bargaining and threats, and to suggest that
they would leave the new nation in anarchy if they walked out and did not get
“equal” representation in the upper house (Senate). Thus, the good of the
greater number (preservation of a “union”) was possible through a bargaining,
not principled, mode64 (the threatened use of the “sword” rather than a prin-
cipled argument). Elster goes on to explore other dimensions of the interaction
of particular techniques of human discourse (principled argument and truth
claims, the uses of threats and warnings in bargaining) with particular modes of
meeting and deliberating (or not) and their impact on lawmaking. For example,
the French Constitutional Assembly of 1789–91 prohibited its constitutional
delegates from serving in the first Assembly, while the American Convention
did not (providing both some intertemporal conflicts of interests, but also some
responsibility for enforcing originalist intentions). Other students of process
have now also examined the American Constitutional Convention in process
terms to study whether particular modes of negotiation and bargaining—self-
interest-based versus group-interest-based, dyadic versus multiparty modes,
facilitated versus unfacilitated discourse—were more or less likely to produce
particular outcomes.65
Whether you have followed all of these details of process differences up
to this point or not (if you have, you would have noticed that Elster drops
the motivation, or mode of “passion,” from his four-fold table, though he
has written eloquently on the role of emotions and passions in political and
social life66), the point here is that process matters. As human beings, we
engage in all of these three different modes of discourse (appeals to prin-
ciples, arguments, and reasons; bargained-for or traded interests or prefer-
ences (whether individualized or collectively based, whether self-interested
or altruistic); and passions, emotions, and beliefs), and the challenge of
modern legal process is to use Fuller’s process architecture to design
64. It could be argued that one-state-one-vote is a principled argument too—although just not a fully
democratic principle.
65. See generally Dana Lansky, Proceeding to a Constitution: A Multi-Party Negotiation Analysis of
the Constitutional Convention of 1787, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 279 (2000); Jack N. Rakove, The Great
Compromise: Ideas, Interests, and the Politics of Constitution Making, 44 WM. & MARY Q. 424 (1987).
And, in a titillating suggestion in his recent book Founding Brothers, the historian Joseph Ellis suggests
that Abigail Adams asked her husband, John Adams, to consider a coalition government with Thomas
Jefferson when the 1796 election results remained in doubt. See JOSEPH J. ELLIS, FOUNDING BROTHERS
179–83 (2000). Imagine how different our governmental processes might have been if that advice had
been heeded. According to Ellis, Jefferson considered it and discussed it with James Madison, who
discouraged the idea of a coalition or shared government, instead urging Jefferson to return to
Monticello to lead the new Republican party. Id. Thus was formed our contentious two-party system.
66. See generally JON ELSTER, ALCHEMIES OF THE MIND: RATIONALITY AND THE EMOTIONS (1999); JON
ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGMENTS: STUDIES IN THE LIMITATIONS OF RATIONALITY (1997); see also JACK KATZ,
HOW EMOTIONS WORK (1999); Peter Reilly, Teaching Law Students How To Feel: Using Negotiations
Training To Increase Emotional Intelligence, 21 NEG. J. 301 (2005) (both discussing the importance of
emotions in human decisionmaking, including the commission of crimes and choice of negotiation
strategies).
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processes that are appropriate for the expression of all of these modes. We
want a house of justice, after all, that has room enough for all forms of
productive and peace-seeking engagement.
IV. MODERN PROCESS PLURALISM:
BEYOND THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND LITIGATION
This combination of the work of Hart & Sacks and Fuller (the “classics of the
Legal Process School”), and Elster’s more theoretical and empirical work, has
led me in recent years to try to answer some of Fuller’s (and my own) questions
about process. Does each of the “basic” processes identified by Fuller have its
own moral identities or, as he put it, “integrity”? Do different processes call not
just for different decision rules (e.g., consensual agreements, authoritative
decisions, empathetic understandings, and collective compromises) but different
process rules and different ethical obligations?67 Can processes be combined
and hybridized to meet modern varieties of decisionmaking and political choice?
And, is there a greater truth in Madison’s claim in The Federalist Papers Nos.
10 and 51 of the need for “checks and balances” of different kinds of processes
and different sources of power, argument, and modalities of decisionmaking to
prevent the control and domination of either a dominant majority or the
unruliness of factions?68
To all these questions I have answered “yes” and have begun to map the
greater varieties of legal processes, along dimensions suggested by Elster,
but expanded to include the modern variations on basic process themes:
67. I have spent much of the last seven years participating in efforts to craft both ethical “credos”
and specific ethical rules for different dispute resolution modalities. Lon Fuller and David Filvaroff
would be proud to see how much I have learned about lawmaking by attempting to draft rules and
policies for a multi-disciplinary profession. See, e.g., CTR. FOR PUB. RESOURCES, GEORGETOWN COMMIS-
SION ON ETHICS AND STANDARDS IN ADR, MODEL RULE FOR THE LAWYER AS THIRD PARTY NEUTRAL (2002),
available at http://cpradr.org/pdfs/CPRGeorge-ModelRule.pdf; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as
Consensus Builder: Ethics for a New Practice, 70 TENN. L. REV. 63 (2002).
68. Madison’s analysis of the causes and effects of factions (including the observation that where
there are many, there is less likely to be domination by the one or few on all issues or interests) is a
masterful and quite modern discussion of the role of “numbers” and “interests” in group decisionmak-
ing and democracy, as well as the “agent-principal” issues of direct versus represented actions. See Nos.
47–51 for Madison’s artful elaboration of the necessity for having separate processes and governmental
institutions for the “separation of powers” that will preserve a republican, not direct, democracy. “[T]he
Government’s several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each in
their proper places.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). Thus, different processes, like different
branches of government, “check” each other and allow particular issues to be dealt with in appropriate
fora.
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Forms of
Process
Modes of Conflict Resolution
Principles (Reasons)
Bargaining
(Interests and
Needs)
Passions /Emotions/
Religion
Closed ● Some court
proceedings
● Arbitration
● Negotiation (e.g.,
U.S. Constitution)
● Diplomacy
● Mediation (e.g.,
divorce)
● Jury trials (some)
Open ● French Constitution
● Arbitration (some)
● Public negotiations
(e.g., some labor)
● Problem-solving
courts
● Dialogue movement
● Truth and
reconciliation
commissions
Plenary ● French Constitution ● Reg-neg (negotiated
rulemaking)
● Town meetings
Committees ● Faculty committees
● Task groups
● U.S. Constitution
● U.S. Congress
● Caucuses
● Special interest
groups
Expert/
Facilitator
● Consensus-building ● Mini-trials
● Mediation
● Public conversations
Naturalistic
(Leaderless)
● Grassroots organizing
● WTO protests
● Support for troops
Permanent ● Government
● Institutions
● Business
organizations
● Unions
● Religious
organizations
● Alcoholics
Anonymous
● Weight Watchers
Constitutive ● United Nations
● National constitutions
● National
constitutions
● Professional
associations
● Civil justice
movements
● Truth and
reconciliation
commissions
Temporary/Ad Hoc ● Issue
organization/social
justice
● War crimes tribunals
● Interest groups ● Yippies
● New Age devotes
● Vigilantes
Principles reasons, appeals to universalism, law
Bargaining  interests, preferences, trading, compromises, needs as differ-
entiated from interests in social-welfare terms, self-interest as differentiated
from group interests
Closed confidential, secret processes or even outcomes (settlements)
Open public or transparent meetings or proceedings
Plenary full group participation, joint meetings
Committees task groups, caucuses, parts of the whole
Expert-facilitator led by expertise (process or substantive or both)
Naturalistic leaderless, grassroots, ad hoc, direct democracy
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Permanent organizational, institutional
Constitutive “constitutional”
Some predicted effects of process on outcome:
Closed (confidential) proceedings allow more expression of interests, needs,
and passions  more “honest” and “candid,” allowing more “trades” and less
posturing, but exposing vulnerability
Open (transparent) proceedings require more principled/reasoned justifica-
tions more rigidity
In Fuller’s terms, different human problems will require different processes
for effective “solution.” With Elster’s analysis we know that we can choose to
use different modalities of expression in different stages of decisionmaking to
achieve different ends.
And thus, the modern study and practice of legal process must include more
than the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the Federal Rules of Evidence
(though I teach those too!). Conventional learning about litigation and legal
process has been enhanced by the study of negotiation, mediation, and other
new, “alternative” processes. Let me illustrate the variations of modern pro-
cesses with some examples of some newer forms of process which make
possible the combination of a greater variety of human forms of discourse, with
the potential to achieve a greater number of human goals (peace and justice, as
well as freedom, restitution, needs-satisfaction, etcetera), all at the same time.
As modern legal and governmental processes have proven inadequate in
settings that involve party polarization, gridlock, impasse, or a greater number
of parties than can use dyadic negotiation or triadic adjudication and arbitration
processes, we have recently begun to use a variety of different processes
intended to give expression and empowerment to greater numbers of people
(this is “justice” in the participatory form). Such new processes are also
beneficial when there are a greater number of legitimate claims or issues than
traditional litigation can assimilate into its binary mode.69 For example, in the
pages of our very own Georgetown Law Journal twenty years ago, administra-
tive lawyer Philip Harter proposed a new form of administrative rulemaking—
69. In the United States, the law reforms of the New Deal and the Civil Rights era have provided
more legal rights for employees, minorities, welfare recipients, school children, and millions of new
citizens. In the international arena, new institutions and treaties have provided for “legitimate claims”
for human rights violations and other substantive rights to millions of people. In newly independent
nations or nations transformed by political struggles, new constitutions have created many more rights.
See generally DEFINING THE FIELD OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Vicki C. Jackson & Mark
Tushnet eds., 2002). Combined with the new processes I describe herein, new legal claims and new
processes for their enactment, expression, and enforcement have expanded how the whole world views
legal process—the study of which is emphasized in our new global curriculum at Georgetown. See, e.g.,
Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., Georgetown Law Initiates Week One: Law in a Global Context (Jan. 6,
2006), http://www.law.georgetown.edu/news/weekone.html.
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“reg-neg,” or negotiated rulemaking—which sought to bring all interested
parties or “stakeholders”70 into a single room, with sufficient time to negotiate,
using the newly elaborated principles of “problem solving or principled bargain-
ing.”71 In these proceedings, parties72 negotiate such matters as health and
safety standards, environmental standards and siting, and allocation of scarce
resources (e.g., water and clean air) with skilled facilitators to arrive at “solu-
tions” fully negotiated by interested parties. The theory is that negotiated rules
or outcomes will be less likely to be litigated than with the conventional (and
adversarial) notice and comment process mandated by the Administrative Proce-
dure Act. The jury is still out on the full efficacy and efficiency of these
particular processes,73 but their more general use as “consensus building”
processes74 for use in federal, state, and local governmental decisionmaking, as
well as in a myriad of local, community, and multiparty disputes, is growing
exponentially.
V. RECENT INNOVATIONS: THE UPPER FLOORS
With an expressed goal of enhancing democratic participation by interested
parties in matters that affect their lives, skilled process facilitators75 (my
students here and others!) assist parties who have conflicts or disputes, or who
have to make decisions together, to communicate effectively, empathically, and
with understanding. Such process facilitators help to explain the significance of,
and help formulate, ground rules or process rules (the “constitutions” of group
decisionmaking) and decision rules (majority, supermajority, full unanimity, or
some other form of consensus)76 to assist parties to work together in a mixture
70. Though this has become the common term of art in the field of conflict resolution, I worry about
its rootedness in conventional and colonial property principles. I prefer “interested or affected parties.”
One who has a “stake” or drives a stake onto property may privilege particular legal regimes or
ownership schemes.
71. Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1, 1, 28–31, 33–34,
42, 82–86 (1982).
72. Of course, some will argue this is just another form of “substituted representation,” because real
parties or the larger number of citizens seldom actually participate, but instead depend on articulate and
well-resourced representatives.
73. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated
Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255 (1997); Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative
State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1997); Philip J. Harter, A Plumber Responds to the Philosophers: A
Comment on Professor Menkel-Meadow’s Essay on Deliberative Democracy, 5 NEV. L.J. 379 (2004–
2005) (each arguing about the efficacy, legitimacy, and effectiveness of completed reg-neg processes).
74. See generally SUSAN L. CARPENTER & W.J.D. KENNEDY, MANAGING PUBLIC DISPUTES: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE FOR GOVERNMENT, BUSINESS, AND CITIZEN’S GROUPS (2001); THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK:
A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REACHING AGREEMENT (Lawrence Susskind et al. eds., 1999).
75. See generally, e.g., GARY T. FURLONG, THE CONFLICT RESOLUTION TOOLBOOK: MODELS & MAPS FOR
ANALYZING, DIAGNOSING AND RESOLVING CONFLICT (2005); SUZANNE GHAIS, EXTREME FACILITATION:
GUIDING GROUPS THROUGH CONTROVERSY AND COMPLEXITY (2005); ROGER M. SCHWARZ, THE SKILLED
FACILITATOR: PRACTICAL WISDOM FOR DEVELOPING EFFECTIVE GROUPS (1994).
76. As an example of the effects of different voting or decision rules, I often point to the outcomes
produced by different voting rules for law faculty appointments. Consider how unanimity or consensus
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of principled argument, traded preferences, and full expression of emotions and
beliefs. Those urging more “democratic deliberation” in our polarized society
have applied such processes to such matters as the uses of the World Trade
Center site,77 inter-ethnic and inter-racial community tensions, and the setting of
land use, environmental, and educational policies in areas requiring decision
and action.
In addition, but with different purposes, these processes have been used to
facilitate “dialogue,” study circles, or “public conversations”78 on such
contested matters as abortion, gun control, animal rights, affirmative action,
and the war in Iraq, where the goal is enhanced human understanding across
deeply felt value divides, rather than the making of a decision.79 With
different sorts of procedural rules than the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
ground rules specify how people can speak directly to each other with
respect and dignity, with requests for reasons, more information, and justifi-
cation for views, and in a spirit of “appreciative inquiry” rather than
adversarial besting or winning. Such processes are intended to enhance
public participation, create more enlightened citizens, and produce higher
quality and more variegated, creative, and tailored solutions to modern
complex problems than conventional on/off decisions produced by the
conventional adversary system of trial, or unprincipled compromise in its
shadow.80
As one of the creators of these modern hybrid processes has put it, “consen-
sus building allows a group to reach the best agreement it can find, not just one
rules tend to reproduce the sameness of faculty interests (University of Chicago Law School for many
years as an example), while simple majorities might produce greater diversity at the appointment stage
but could lead to more divisiveness and tension at the tenure stage. Law faculties vary from simple
majority to two-thirds supermajorities to virtual consensus voting rules in such matters, and the
outcomes are much affected by the voting rules. Consider also how the Electoral College voting system
affects campaigns (presence in only the most populous or contested states) and how we are currently
embattled over the filibuster rules in the Senate because of the effects these process rules have on the
outcomes.
77. Civil Alliance to Rebuild Downtown N.Y., Listening to the City: Report of Proceedings (2002),
available at http://www.americaspeaks.org/resources/library/as/project_files/ltc/final_report_ltc2.pdf. See
also descriptions of various facilitated democratic discussions at America Speaks, Our Projects,
http://www.americaspeaks.org/projects/index.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2006).
78. See Laura Chasin, How To Break the Argument Habit, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 26, 2004, at
8; see, e.g., Public Coversations Project, Constructive Conversations That Reach Across Differences,
http://www.publicconversations.org (last visited Jan. 4, 2006) (suggesting protocols and providing
discussion guides for facilitating “difficult” conversations across value divides).
79. See LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE: CONSENSUAL APPROACHES
TO RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPUTES 1031 (1989); see generally LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & PATRICK FIELD,
DEALING WITH AN ANGRY PUBLIC: THE MUTUAL GAINS APPROACH TO RESOLVING DISPUTES (1996).
80. Whether negotiated settlements of legal cases are “unprincipled” or based on settling for
“transaction costs” or based on principled legal endowments remains a hotly contested issue among
scholars in my field, and anecdotally among practicing lawyers and mediators. Compare Janet Cooper
Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV.
497 (1991), with Robert Mnookin & Louis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
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that is barely acceptable to a majority” (or, I would add, commanded by
someone external to the group).81
With my own experience with such processes, I helped design82 a process for
dialogue on the contested issue of affirmative action in California—Proposition
209,83 which proposed the abolition of the use of affirmative action in educa-
tion, employment, and contracting with the state. In a series of workshops,
based on the process protocols of the group Public Conversations, we asked a
diverse set of participants to talk about their views, while identifying the source
of their own views (political, demographic, experiential), the questions they had
about their own views, the questions they had about others’ views, and what
further data they might need to consider the merits of the issue. In such dialogic
settings, participants actually revealed complex views. Some favored affirma-
tive action in education but not in state contracting, some favored affirmative
action for African-Americans still burdened by the effects of slavery and
discrimination, but not for other more recently arrived ethnic groups. Partici-
pants learned they could share information, learn from each other, and actually
change their views.84 Such a political issue was seen for what it is—an issue of
value differences, with empirical claims about effectiveness,85 and great complex-
ity. If the electoral system had not required a simplistic yes/no vote86 on this
complex issue, I believe the outcomes would have been different and could
have provided more tailored solutions to a complex set of social issues and
demands. The dilemma of electoral democracy is that it often prevents the more
deliberative process in which people can actually learn things from each other.87
Another illustration of such new processes is the recent completion of the
September 11 Victims Compensation Fund, mastered by our own Adjunct
81. Lawrence Susskind, Breaking Robert’s Rules: Consensus-Building Techniques for Group Deci-
sion Making, NEGOTIATION (Harvard Business Sch. Publ’g and the Program on Negotiation at Harvard
Law Sch.), May 1, 2005, at 3.
82. With my colleague Howard Gadlin, present today, who was then co-director (with me) at UCLA
of the Center for Study and Resolution of Interracial/Interethnic Conflict and is currently Ombuds for
the National Institutes of Health.
83. Codified at Cal. Const. art. I, § 31(a) (approved Nov. 5, 1996).
84. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 14, at 34–35 & n.139.
85. See the current debate about what affirmative action has done in legal education in Richard H.
Sander’s A Systematic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV. 367
(2004), and the many responses and refutations this article has generated. See, e.g., Katherine S.
Mangan, Hot Type, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 22, 2005, at A23; Responses, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1807
(2005) (responses to Sander’s article, supra, and a reply by Sander).
86. For a description of how the on/off vote led to further litigation, see Vikram D. Amar & Evan H.
Caminker, Equal Protection, Unequal Political Burdens, and the CCRI, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1019
(1996).
87. James Fishkin’s recent efforts to develop deliberative polling addresses some of these issues. In
his experiments, citizens are given information about issues and talk to each other before they are
“polled” to express an opinion on a particular political issue. His research supports the notion that
people actually do change their minds and educate each other. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN & JAMES
S. FISHKIN, DELIBERATION DAY (2004); JAMES S. FISHKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION: NEW DIRECTIONS
FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORM (1991); JAMES S. FISHKIN, THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE: PUBLIC OPINION AND
DEMOCRACY (1995).
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Professor Kenneth Feinberg.88 In order to prevent bankruptcy of our nation’s
airline industry (an economic and business efficiency motivating reason), our
government authorized a one-time-only claims process (conducted in a hybrid
form of arbitration and a little mediation) in which virtually all of the eligible
victims filed claims and were entitled to have a hearing with the special master
or his delegate and receive a payment from the government.89 While many
proclaim the sui generis nature of this claims process, I think it might open the
possibility of alternative forms of treatment of our mass products, and natural,
as well as man-made, disaster tort claims.90
In yet another example of hybrid processes, in recent years there has been a
growth of what are called “problem-solving or integrated courts,” designed to
deal in multi-disciplinary ways with a host of social-legal issues like vice,
drugs, and complex family law issues.91 In these courts treatment programs are
developed—including counseling, drug addiction remediation, and accountabil-
ity—as alternatives to various forms of punishment. Judges often find them-
selves performing more client-centered social work functions than state-
appointed law and order roles.
In a related development, various forms of “restorative justice,”92 where
victims of crimes directly confront perpetrators and receive apologies and
restitution and participate in reconciliation efforts, have been used as both
substitutes for and supplements to the traditional criminal justice system. Here
the animating purpose is reintegration into a community, rather than “mere”
punishment, whether used for retributive or deterrent rationales.
Whether such hybrid processes are hurt by failing to have a clear “moral
88. See 1 KENNETH R. FEINBERG ET AL., FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER FOR THE SEPTEMBER 11TH
VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001 (n.d.), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/final_report.pdf (last
visited Jan. 4, 2006); KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH? (2005).
89. For some discussion of many of the issues raised by this process, see Symposium, After
Disaster: The September 11th Compensation Fund and the Future of Civil Justice, 53 DEPAUL L. REV.
205–928 (2003), and Nancy J. Knauer, The September 11 Attacks and Surviving Same-Sex Partners:
Defining Family Through Tragedy, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 31 (2002).
90. Currently pending before the Congress is another attempt to provide such a process for a federal
claims facility for the massive number of asbestos claims remaining in our court system. See FAIR Act
of 2005, S. 852, 109th Cong. (2005).
91. See, e.g., GREG BERMAN & JOHN FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS (2005); Greg Berman & John
Feinblatt, Problem-Solving Courts: A Brief Primer, 23 LAW & POL’Y 125 (2001); Michael C. Dorf &
Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent Experimentalist Government, 53 VAND. L. REV.
831 (2000); Judith S. Kaye, Changing Courts in Changing Times: The Need for a Fresh Look at How
Courts Are Run, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 851 (1997); cf. Anthony C. Thompson, Courting Disorder: Some
Thoughts on Community Courts, 10 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 63 (2002) (describing uses of drug, vice,
and integrated family courts and reporting on success rates, recidivism, and contested legal issues).
92. See generally David Lerman, Restoring Justice, TIKKUN, Sept.–Oct. 1999, at 13; Marty Price,
Personalizing Crime: Mediation Produces Restorative Justice for Victims and Offenders, DISP. RESOL.
MAG., Fall 2000, at 8; Mark S. Umbreit, Mediation of Victim Offender Conflict, 1988 J. DISP. RESOL. 85;
see also SHARI TICKELL & KATE AKESTER, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: THE WAY AHEAD (2004) (describing
restorative justice practices in a variety of different legal jurisdictions); cf. Robert Weisberg, Restorative
Justice and the Danger of “Community,” 2003 UTAH L. REV. 343 (challenging use of restorative justice
where there is no real community).
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mandate,” or “integrity” as Fuller would call it,93 or whether they represent the
creative flowering of a new process consciousness, is what we currently study in
this field of “process pluralism.” How do we design processes appropriate for
particular human and legal problems? Can we lay down rules in advance, or
should we allow process to emerge from democratic deliberation? Can we
develop processes in advance of conflicts or disputes to prevent various forms
of human contention—or worse—violence?94
Skilled process architects and managers, in a Fullerian sense, know that
particular process structures and decision rules (who decides and by “how
much,” or with what reasons) affect both the outcomes reached and their
acceptability and legitimacy by those upon whom they act. So these newer
combined processes of decisionmaking or human engagement form the upper
floors of my house of justice, but what of the highest level—the achievement of
peace and justice?
VI. THE WAY FORWARD
In the last ten years or so we have seen the flowering of process creativity in
attempts to create whole new processes for human governance. Out of the
horrors of apartheid, political oppression, genocide, and civil and ethnic wars,
we, as a species, have created truth and reconciliation commissions95 and have
adapted traditional community justice systems like gacaca96 in Rwanda, while
using more traditional forms of adjudicated justice in the international war
crimes tribunals of the former Yugoslavia,97 Rwanda, and other sites.98
These new processes are intended to work on the levels of the most aspira-
93. Or a clear set of defining rules and ethics.
94. The Committee on Conscience of the United States Holocaust Museum is developing a program
on “early warning” genocide detection in the hopes of averting such tragedies as Rwanda, Bosnia, and
Darfur. Interview with Jerry Fowler, Staff Director, United States Holocaust Museum, in Washington,
D.C. (July 2005).
95. See generally JAMES L. GIBSON, OVERCOMING APARTHEID: CAN TRUTH RECONCILE A DIVIDED
NATION? (2004); IMAGINE COEXISTENCE: RESTORING HUMANITY AFTER VIOLENT ETHNIC CONFLICT (Antonia
Chayes & Martha Minow eds., 2003); MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING
HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE (1998); see also ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ATROCITIES: NA-
TIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES (Jane E. Stromseth ed., 2003) (reporting on efforts to create and
manage truth and reconciliation commissions in South Africa, Rwanda, and Guatemala and attempting
to assess the effectiveness of these processes); David Dyzenhaus, Debating South Africa’s Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, 49 U. TORONTO L.J. 311 (1999).
96. See generally Maya Goldstein-Bolocan, Rwandan Gacaca: An Experiment in Transitional
Justice, 2004 J. DISP. RESOL. 355; Catherine Honeyman et al., Establishing Collective Norms: Poten-
tials for Participatory Justice in Rwanda, 10 PEACE & CONFLICT: J. PEACE PSYCHOL. 1 (2004) (authored
by former students of mine who have studied, written about, and visited Rwanda).
97. See generally Patricia M. Wald, Accountability for War Crimes: What Roles for National,
International and Hybrid Tribunals?, 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 192 (2004); Patricia M. Wald,
General Radislav Krstic: A War Crimes Case Study, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS, 445 (2003); Patricia M.
Wald, The Omarska Trial—A War Crimes Tribunal Close-Up, 57 SMU L. REV. 271 (2004); Patricia M.
Wald, Why I Support the International Criminal Court, 21 WIS. INT’L L.J. 513 (2003).
98. Including the International Criminal Court of which we (the United States) are not a participant.
See Larry Charles Dembowski, The International Criminal Court: Complimentarity and Its Conse-
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tional—of what could be best in our human species, often after what has been
the worst—terrible violence. Intended to provide “truth” and “answers” for
those who have been killed or seriously harmed (and their families), these
processes “triage” cases so that the “least” serious can be dealt with by offering
forgiveness, healing, and the possibility of reconciliation and the creation of a
new and more peaceful society. These processes are the first I have seen to
really take the emotional life of humans seriously. By use of narrative, storytell-
ing, and some confrontation, victims and perpetrators meet head-on99 in a
protected setting in which they are called to account on legal, emotional, and,
ultimately, human levels.100
These new processes are also quite controversial, and their successes and
limits are being explored by participants and scholars. Nevertheless, political
scientist James Gibson has concluded, after rigorous public opinion research,
that those who participated in (or even only watched) the South African truth
and reconciliation processes, even with all their weaknesses,101 were more
likely to have internalized a “human rights consciousness” with an enhanced
belief (or hope) in the rule of law to improve human relations102 and achieve
justice. This is consistent with decades of research in what is called “procedural
justice,” by social psychologists Tom Tyler and Allan Lind, finding that people
judge their satisfaction with legal processes by their participation in and percep-
tions of fairness of those processes, irrespective of the outcomes.103
In many settings, these new processes of forgiveness, reconciliation, and
new-constitution-drafting have come from new participants in the process
design. Women104 and disempowered racial, ethnic, or religious groups are
increasingly finding their voices, after great catastrophe, in the creation of new
quences, in ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ATROCITIES: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES, supra note 95, at
135.
99. In contrast to the “informal” encounter in Ariel Dorfman’s Death and the Maiden of victim and
perpetrator. ARIEL DORFMAN, DEATH AND THE MAIDEN (1994).
100. See generally PUMLA GOBODO-MADIKIZELA, A HUMAN BEING DIED THAT NIGHT: A SOUTH AFRICAN
STORY OF FORGIVENESS (2003).
101. See generally DAVID DYZENHAUS, JUDGING THE JUDGES, JUDGING OURSELVES: TRUTH, RECONCILIA-
TION AND THE APARTHEID LEGAL ORDER (1998).
102. This “attitudinal” study, of course, does not speak to behaviors. Gibson also found quite
pronounced racial variants in these views. Apartheid consciousness cannot be eliminated in a day or
even several years and clearly must have economic redistributive equality counterparts. See generally
GIBSON, supra note 95.
103. See generally E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
(1988); TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990); E. Allan Lind et al., In the Eye of the
Beholder: Tort Litigants’ Evaluations of Their Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 953 (1990); see also Lawrence Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181 (2004); cf.
Laurens Walker et al., Reactions of Participants and Observers to Modes of Adjudication, 4 J. APPLIED
SOC. PSYCHOL. 295 (1974).
104. It may be no accident that women and minorities of various sorts are disproportionately
interested in creating new processes of democratization, participation, and more consensus-based forms
of decisionmaking. As Audre Lourde put it so eloquently, “[T]he master’s tools will never dismantle the
master’s house.” AUDRE LOURDE, The Master’s Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master’s House, in
SISTER OUTSIDER 110, 111 (1984).
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communities and governments, and seeking new processes to participate in, so
that old factions and patterns of power domination will not be repeated. Those
who are creating these new processes are interested in justice, but they also
want peace—to live together with mutual respect, to have sufficient resources to
be free from want or illness and to be able to seek their own forms of human
flourishing. But many of these processes have still come too late—post hoc or
after terrible conflict and violence and injustice.105 Can we imagine the use of
such processes before the terrible conflict, violence, and injustice happens,
preventing the Rwandan genocide, the Holocaust, Darfur, and more unnecessary
killing in the Mideast?106 What processes can we develop for preventative
dispute resolution, when our legal education and processes are so currently
focused on the past (lawsuits and judicial decisionmaking from past disputes)?
This, then, is the top of my house of justice—a multi-purpose process room
on the roof—in which creative process architects attempt to build new forms of
human engagement. The roof may be a challenging place or metaphor with
which to end my lecture. For while some of you will see it as “closer” to God or
heaven, others will fear the elements (rain, wind, or even human falls and
suicides) that can destroy or harm these new experimental efforts at human
problem-solving. Social and political philosophers doubt whether we can achieve
“consensus” on hotly contested value choices or whether consensus is unprin-
cipled, unjust, or compromised. Many theorists and practitioners (my pollster
husband among them) are skeptical that most people are well informed enough
or have enough time, energy, and commitment to truly deliberate with each
other,107 let alone negotiate, listen, empathize with, and form consensus on the
conflicts, disputes, and policies with which we live. Current examples of
conflicts between the Palestinians and Israeli Jews, and Sunnis and Shiahs in
Iraq, not to mention the Blues and Reds of our own country,108 can make even
the greatest process optimist a pessimist about deliberation, mutual respect, and
shared governance. How can we use tame and humane processes to conquer the
105. And these processes raise the enormous issue of how to fully reconcile the past with the future
in conflicts between choosing punishment, retribution, deterrence, and forgiveness and reconciliation.
See generally Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, Remembrance of Things Past? The Relationship of Past to
Future in Pursuing Justice in Mediation, 5 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 97 (2004).
106. See DENNIS ROSS, THE MISSING PEACE: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE FIGHT FOR MIDDLE EAST PEACE
(2004).
107. See generally AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? (2004);
MICHAEL WALZER, PASSION AND POLITICS: TOWARD A MORE EGALITARIAN LIBERALISM (2004); IRIS MARION
YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY (2000); Frederick Schauer, Talking as a Decision Procedure, in
DELIBERATIVE POLITICS: ESSAYS ON DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 17 (Stephen Macedo ed., 1999);
Symposium, The Lawyer’s Role(s) in Deliberative Democracy: A Commentary by and Responses to
Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow, 5 NEV. L.J. 347 (2004–2005) (articles by Jennifer Gerarda Brown,
Philip J. Harter, Katherine R. Kruse, Bobbi McAdoo & Nancy A. Welsh, Dmitri N. Shalin and Jeffrey
W. Stempel). But see FISHKIN, supra note 87 (promoting deliberative polling by polling participants on
their views about public issues only after they have participated in informational and interactive
exchanges with other citizens).
108. See, e.g., Daniel Yankelovich, Across the Red-Blue Divide: How To Start a Conversation,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 15, 2004, at 10.
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real human and value divides among us?
The challenges for us are many in creating and sustaining new forms of
processes with which to seek peace and justice:
1. What should the role of emotions/passions/beliefs be in our conflicts and
deliberations with each other?109 Transformative empathy is among the most
significant and important ways of grounding justice and moving people to
new places. (Think Martin Luther King, Jr., the Civil Rights Movement, and
parents of gays whose love for their children teaches them to change their
views; think contra the emotional appeals of fascists and demagogues that tap
into the baser forms of group identity and values).
2. How do we reconcile the need to adjudicate and punish the past, with
correction of injustice, with reintegration of the future with peace and forgive-
ness, if not forgetfulness?110
3. Do we need “rules” of process and decision rules “laid down” in advance,
or can we negotiate and deliberate about the very processes we will use to
achieve peace and justice in different contexts (historically, geographically,
and culturally)?
4. How do we deal with the tyranny of the majority in a democracy and the
needs of minorities for recognition and fulfillment (whether temporary, by
issue or politics, or more permanent, by group or other identification)?111
I have many suggestions for these challenges and refutations to these (and
other) objections but am rapidly running out of time and space, so let me
conclude with my best refutation and hope for the future—my students in this
room and around the world. If I began my career as a justice-seeking legal
services lawyer who brought lawsuits and knew only how to build one kind of
house, our current students are learning to be truly Fullerian process architects
109. This has become one of the most important areas of new work in the field of legal process and
negotiation. See generally, e.g., ROGER FISHER & DANIEL SHAPIRO, BEYOND REASON: USING EMOTIONS AS
YOU NEGOTIATE (2005); Erin Ryan, The Discourse Beneath: Emotional Epistemology in Legal Delibera-
tion and Negotiation, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 231 (2005).
110. See generally EVA HOFFMAN, AFTER SUCH KNOWLEDGE: MEMORY, HISTORY, AND THE LEGACY OF
THE HOLOCAUST (2004) (exploring philosophical and historical approaches to different forms of forgive-
ness and remembrance, accountability and reconciliation, seen through the lens of the Holocaust);
AVISHAI MARGALIT, THE ETHICS OF MEMORY (2002).
111. See generally ROBERT A. DAHL, ON DEMOCRACY (1998); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY
(1980); CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1970); ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING
DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY (1993); IAN SHAPIRO, THE STATE OF DEMOCRACTIC
THEORY (2003) (all discussing the longstanding debate by political theorists as to how to reconcile
majoritarian and minority interests in participatory (and voting) democracies).
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who can build many human-made structures to solve human problems.112 With
our talented and creative student body of domestic J.D. and international LL.M.
students, we have, in my recent classes in multiparty dispute resolution, de-
signed processes and facilitated consensus solutions to such problems as chemi-
cal weapon disarmament, community land use, global warming, cloning, Cyprus,
Kashmir, the Middle East, diamond mining, Northern Ireland, and Georgetown
journal policies. Learning how to negotiate, mediate, facilitate,113 and yes,
litigate, in many different languages—participating in these processes in experi-
ential ways, and every semester creating new ideas for new processes for the
never-ending array of human problems needing solutions, resolutions, or han-
dling—my best answers to doubters of new forms of consensus-building and
deliberative democracy are the students of this law school and citizens of our
global society who will fly off that roof with their hopes and plans for new ways
to achieve peace and justice.
For if my years as a teacher of procedure and process have taught me
anything, it is that process is the human bridge between justice and peace. I
hope to be in this inspiring construction process114 with all of you for a long
time to come.
112. This has important implications for what we teach and what I teach—meeting management,
group facilitation, dealing with emotions as well as with logical arguments, asking questions, really
listening and hearing, creative problem-solving, and process system design, among other topics new to
the legal curriculum.
113. All I have said here about process diversity and variation has enormous implications for what
we should be teaching as Process in law schools. Elsewhere, I have discussed the importance of
teaching facilitation skills, meeting management, group dynamics, strategic voting theory and practice,
and the economics, mathematics, sociology, and psychology of decisionmaking, along with our usual
staples of rules, doctrines, and policy. Different process rules and different decision rules produce
different outcomes. Any modern lawyer needs to understand these dynamics for designing, choosing,
and advising about what processes to use for what purposes. See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Aha? Is Creativity Possible in Legal Problem Solving and Teachable in Legal Education?, 6 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 97 (2001); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as Problem Solver and Third-Party
Neutral: Creativity and Non-Partisanship in Lawyering, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 785 (1999).
114. My father is an engineer and painter; my mother, a cook and seamstress; my brother, a doctor
and photographer; so I come from pretty diverse process stock. And to build a house of justice, we will
need the expertise of many different kinds of people.
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